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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.  
 This appeal arises under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
Section 1415(j) of that law—commonly known as the “stay-
put” provision—provides generally that eligible students must 
remain in their current educational settings during certain 
procedures. But Section 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I)—the intrastate 
transfer provision—says that schools need only provide 
eligible transfer students comparable services to those they 
were previously receiving. The question presented is whether 
the “stay-put” provision applies, thereby requiring provision of 
the same services the child was previously receiving, when a 
student voluntarily transfers school districts within a state. Like 
the District Court, we hold it does not.  
I 
A 
 S.B. is a twelve-year-old boy diagnosed with Down 
Syndrome. As a result, he “shows delays in cognitive, social, 
and motor areas,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 1-3, at 3, and requires 
special educational care. In 2014, S.B. and his parents moved 
from Brooklyn, New York, to Lakewood, New Jersey. Upon 
the family’s arrival, S.B.’s parents requested an individualized 
education program (IEP) for S.B. from the Lakewood 
Township School District. Lakewood determined it could not 




education (FAPE) at its own public schools, so it crafted an 
IEP that placed S.B. at the private School for Children with 
Hidden Intelligence (SCHI). Lakewood reimbursed Appellant 
for SCHI-associated costs.  
 In November 2016, shortly after S.B.’s Lakewood IEP 
was renewed for another year—including the provision 
providing for his placement at SCHI—the family moved 
homes and transferred S.B. from Lakewood to the Howell 
School District.  Howell’s staff reviewed the Lakewood IEP 
and met with S.B. and his parents at Memorial Elementary 
School. After meeting with S.B., Howell informed Appellant 
“that [S.B.’s] IEP can be implemented in [Howell’s special 
education] class at Memorial Elementary School where [S.B.] 
will receive a free appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive environment.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 20-7, at 1. Despite 
this assurance, Appellant continued to send S.B. to SCHI. On 
February 3, 2017, Howell terminated S.B.’s enrollment.  
B 
 In July 2017, over seven months after Howell informed 
Appellant it would provide S.B. a FAPE in accordance with his 
IEP, Appellant requested a due process hearing under the 
IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Appellant challenged 
Howell’s refusal to implement S.B.’s IEP—which he argued 
required S.B.’s continued attendance at SCHI regardless of 
Howell’s ability to provide the services the IEP called for—
and asserted that Howell must reimburse Appellant for S.B.’s 
SCHI tuition. In April 2018, an administrative law judge ruled 




the District Court alleging Howell violated the IDEA.1 In 
March 2020, the District Court affirmed the ALJ and granted 
summary judgment for Howell. Appellant timely appealed.  
II 
Y.B.’s cause of action arose under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A), so the District Court had federal question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our jurisdiction lies under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s legal 
conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. 
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 
2014). When, as in this case, the District Court reviews an 
ALJ’s decision, we apply a “modified de novo” standard of 
review, giving “due weight” to the factual determinations of 
the ALJ, which we consider “prima facie correct.” Id. at 266. 
III 
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (since retitled the IDEA), see 20 
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., after determining that a majority of the 
Nation’s disabled children were not receiving adequate public 
educational services.2 The law sought “to ensure that all 
 
1 Appellant also alleged Howell violated comparable 
provisions of the New Jersey Code. The District Court 
exercised supplemental jurisdiction over those claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367. On appeal, Appellant does not argue the state 
law claims, citing the New Jersey Code only twice in passing 
in his opening brief.  
2 The Act “was passed in response to Congress’ perception that 




children with disabilities have available to them a free 
appropriate public education,” or FAPE. § 1400(d)(1)(A). 
Under the IDEA, a FAPE includes “special education and 
related services”—both “designed instruction . . . to meet the 
unique needs of a child,” and “other supportive services” 
necessary to guarantee a child benefits from his special 
education. § 1401(9), (26), (29). 
 “The IDEA offers federal funds to States in exchange 
for a commitment[] to furnish” a FAPE “to all children with 
certain physical or intellectual disabilities.” Fry v. Napoleon 
Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017). Congress recognized, 
however, that the failure of schools to educate disabled 
students “reflected more than a lack of financial resources at 
the state and local levels.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 309 
(1988). So the IDEA “confers upon disabled students an 
enforceable substantive right to public education in 
participating States.” Id. at 310; see also Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749. 
The IDEA also incorporates state law pertaining to the 
educational rights of disabled students so schools must comply 
with both the substantive and procedural requirements of the 
IDEA and state standards. § 1401(9)(B). 
 
either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in 
regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were old 
enough to drop out.’” Geis v. Bd. of Educ. of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 774 F.2d 575, 577 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
94-332, at 2 (1975)). The federal programs that did exist at that 
time to assist disabled students were recognized as “minimal, 
fractionated, uncoordinated, and frequently given a low 





 The “primary vehicle,” Honig, 484 U.S. at 311, for 
providing each eligible student with an IDEA-mandated FAPE 
is the IEP, § 1414(d). An IEP is a written statement, 
“developed, reviewed, and revised” by the “IEP Team”—a 
group of school officials and the parents of the student—that 
spells out how a school will meet an individual disabled 
student’s educational needs. § 1414(d)(1)(A), (B). Most 
notably, an IEP describes a child’s “present levels of academic 
achievement,” offers “measurable annual goals” to “enable the 
child to . . . make progress in the general educational 
curriculum,” and describes “supplementary aids and 
services . . . provided to the child” to meet those goals. 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II)(aa), (IV); accord Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 
749. Of particular relevance here, an IEP focuses on the 
services needed to provide a student with a FAPE, not on the 
brick-and-mortar location where those services are provided. 
Expecting that parents and school officials would 
sometimes disagree about which services were necessary for a 
disabled child to receive a FAPE, Congress created dispute-
resolution procedures in the IDEA. Those protections give 
parents the right to: “examine all records” relating to their 
child’s education, § 1415(b)(1); receive written notification 
before any changes are made to their child’s IEP, § 1415(b)(3); 
file a complaint about the provision of a FAPE, § 1415(b)(6); 
pursue mediation, § 1415(e); begin an “impartial due process 
hearing” before a state educational agency, § 1415(f); and, if 
still unsatisfied, seek judicial review by filing an action in a 






Having discussed the general structure of the IDEA, we 
turn now to the two provisions at issue in this case. The 
“stay-put” provision provides that “during the pendency” of 
certain administrative and legal proceedings, “unless the State 
or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, 
the child shall remain in the then-current educational 
placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).3 The IDEA’s 
intrastate transfer provision, on the other hand, provides that a 
school district receiving an intrastate transfer student with a 
previously existing IEP “shall provide . . . a free appropriate 
public education, including services comparable to those 
described in the previously held IEP, in consultation with the 
parents until such time as the [new district] adopts the 
previously held IEP or develops, adopts, and implements a new 
IEP.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) (emphasis added). In a 
 
3 Since Appellant did not begin a due process hearing under the 
IDEA until July 2017, it is unclear whether any “stay-put”-
eligible proceedings were pending when the dispute between 
Howell and Appellant arose in January 2017. See Michael C. 
ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 654 
(3d Cir. 2000); Kari H. ex rel. Dan H. v. Franklin Special Sch. 
Dist., 125 F.3d 855 (table), 1997 WL 468326, at *6 (6th Cir. 
1997) (per curiam) (listing “due process hearings,” “state 
administrative review,” and “civil actions brought in either 
state or federal district court” as the only ways to trigger the 
“stay-put” provision). Howell did not make this argument, so 
we assume that qualifying proceedings were pending when the 




broad sense, then, both provisions discuss the procedural 
safeguards afforded to students during periods of educational 
transition. Unlike the “stay-put” provision—which requires the 
continued implementation of the child’s original IEP—the 
intrastate transfer provision requires only that the new district 
provide “services comparable” to those in the child’s most 
recent IEP. See id.  
We must first determine which of these two competing 
provisions—each requiring something different from Howell 
(the “same” IEP under the “stay-put” provision, or 
“comparable services” under the intrastate transfer 
provision)—governs this case. Appellant argues the “stay-put” 
provision controls, while Howell claims the intrastate transfer 
provision applies. We agree with Howell, and hold that in a 
voluntary intrastate transfer, the “stay-put” provision does not 
apply, and the new school district need only provide “services 
comparable” to those the student had been receiving under the 
IEP in effect before the transfer. Two flaws in Appellant’s 
proffered approach compel this result. First, Appellant’s broad 
reading of the “stay-put” provision—that it governs even 
voluntary intrastate transfers—would render 
§ 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) a nullity. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (noting “the elementary canon of 
construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to 
render one part inoperative,” “redundant,” or “largely 
superfluous”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174–
79 (2012) (discussing the Surplusage Canon). Second, 
Appellant’s approach would make school district compliance 
with the IDEA’s transfer provisions contingent on the 
unilateral power of the parent to invoke the “stay-put” 




child with all the services listed in his IEP, it would be 
precluded from doing so under Appellant’s approach if the 
parent simply invoked the words “stay-put.” We do not read 
the “stay-put” provision to give parents the unilateral power to 
prevent schools from complying with the IDEA.  
Precedent analyzing “stay-put” buttresses our decision. 
In Honig, the Supreme Court explained that “stay-put’s” 
expansive text is limited by the IDEA’s purpose—to “strip 
schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally 
employed to exclude disabled students . . . from school.” 484 
U.S. at 323. For that reason, we have explained that the “stay-
put” provision “reflect[s] Congress’s conclusion that a child 
with a disability is best served by maintaining her educational 
status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is resolved.” 
M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). 
The “stay-put” provision realizes this purpose by 
implementing “a type of ‘automatic preliminary injunction’ 
preventing local educational authorities from unilaterally 
changing a student’s existing educational program.” Michael 
C. ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 202 F.3d 642, 
650 (3d Cir. 2000).  
The purpose just described is not implicated, however, 
when a parent unilaterally acts to change a student’s school 
district. When a student voluntarily transfers to a new district, 
“the status quo no longer exists.” Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. 
Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded by 
statute on other grounds as stated in G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. 
Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 595 F. App’x 698 (9th 
Cir. 2014). In such situations, the parents of the student must 




Given the tailored nature of the intrastate transfer 
provision, we hold that the “stay-put” provision does not apply 
when a student voluntarily transfers school districts within a 
state and the new school district will satisfy the IDEA by 
complying with the intrastate transfer provision.  
B 
1 
Having determined that Howell did not have to adhere 
to the exact requirements of Lakewood’s IEP (much less the 
continued physical placement of S.B. at the private SCHI, as 
Appellant argues), we turn to whether Howell satisfied its 
obligation to provide S.B. a FAPE as required by the IDEA. 
According to Appellant, Howell’s services were not 
comparable to those S.B. received at SCHI.  
The record lacks evidence to support Appellant’s claim. 
Appellant blames this lack of evidence on the fact he was 
“never . . . afforded an opportunity to challenge Howell’s 
representation that its program was either appropriate or 
comparable to what S.B. had been receiving at SCHI.” Reply 
Br. 7. This is true, but only because of Appellant’s unilateral 
decision to keep S.B. enrolled in SCHI and away from 
Memorial Elementary. Appellant cannot saddle the school 
district with the consequences of his decision. 
On the record before us, we cannot say the services were 
not comparable. Ample evidence shows Howell intended to 
provide “services comparable to those described in [S.B.’s] 
previously held IEP.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I). After 
the Howell IEP Team met S.B. and reviewed his Lakewood 




would receive at Memorial Elementary: “speech therapy three 
times a week in an individual setting and once a week in a 
group setting; occupational therapy two times a week in an 
individual setting and once a week in a group setting; and 
physical therapy once a week in a group setting.” Y.B. ex rel. 
S.B. v. Howell Twp. Bd. of Educ., 2020 WL 1320137, at *2 
(D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2020). That therapy schedule matches the one 
S.B. received under his Lakewood IEP. Howell also “arranged 
for the provision of related services for S.B. consistent with the 
Lakewood IEP and . . . made arrangements for transportation 
services for S.B. and his special need for a welcome on the 
school bus.” Y.B., 2020 WL 1320137, at *2. 
Rather than sending S.B. to Howell and then 
challenging the services as inadequate through a due process 
hearing—the procedure contemplated by the IDEA—
Appellant eschewed the school district’s offer, refused to send 
S.B. to Howell, and unilaterally continued his placement at 
SCHI. In doing so, Appellant prevented Howell from 
implementing its services at all, so there is no evidence the 
services offered were not “comparable.” Because the record 
lacks evidence of non-comparable services, Howell did not 
violate the IDEA. 
2 
The requirements of the intrastate transfer provision 
extend beyond merely the provision of comparable services, 
and include the eventual development, adoption, and 
implementation of a new IEP (or the adoption of the previous 
IEP) by the transferee district. When a parent’s conduct 
bypasses the procedures contemplated by the IDEA, the parent 
deprives the school of the opportunity to comply with the law. 




having the chance to “develop[], adopt[], and implement[] a 
new IEP” for S.B. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I). Under these 
circumstances, Howell cannot be liable for not creating a 
tailored IEP for S.B. 
Because the record discloses no evidence that Howell 
failed to provide S.B. with services comparable to those set 
forth in his prior IEP, the District Court did not err in holding 
that Howell satisfied the intrastate transfer provision. 
V 
Appellant also claims he is entitled to a reimbursement 
from Howell for the costs of S.B.’s attendance at SCHI (for the 
period between December 2016 and July 2017). We disagree. 
“[P]arents who unilaterally change their child’s 
placement . . . without the consent of state or local school 
officials, do so at their own financial risk” because if a school 
district meets its IDEA obligations “the parents would be 
barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period.” 
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 
373–74 (1985).4 Because the “stay-put” provision does not 
apply and all the evidence shows that Howell stood ready to 
provide comparable services, Howell is not responsible for 
reimbursements. 
 
4 In Burlington, the Supreme Court addressed the Education of 
the Handicapped Act (EHA), a predecessor of the IDEA. 
“EHA jurisprudence concerning appropriate remedies has, 
however, been incorporated wholesale into IDEA 
jurisprudence.” D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 




* * * 
The IDEA aims to ensure “that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public 
education that emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A). For students who voluntarily transfer districts 
within a state, we hold the “stay-put” provision inapplicable, 
and a school district will meet its FAPE obligations by 
complying with the intrastate transfer provision. And when a 
school district meets its FAPE obligations, parents have no 
right to reimbursement of tuition costs. For these reasons, we 
will affirm.  
1 
 
Y.B. v. Howell Township Board of Education, No. 20-1840 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
In view of Y.B.’s position that the stay put rule must 
apply here, I would like to expand upon the reasons that, in an 
intrastate-transfer case such as this one, the stay-put provision 
is not applicable in determining a child’s placement. 
 
The stay-put provision “reflect[s] Congress’s 
conclusion that a child with a disability is best served by 
maintaining her educational status quo until the disagreement 
over her IEP is resolved.”1  “[W]hen a plaintiff has challenged 
the student’s educational placement in place at the time the 
‘stay-put provision’ is invoked,”2 courts typically look to the 
last agreed upon placement prior to the dispute over the 
proposed placement.3  Yet, when a student transfers to a new 
school district, that is not so.  In that situation, contrary to 
Y.B.’s position before us, the intrastate-transfer provision 
governs the placement of the child.   
 
In Michael C. ex rel. Stephen C. v. Radnor Twp. Sch. 
Dist.,4 we suggested that a state’s agreement might be 
sufficient to bind a local school district to the placement 
provided for in a particular IEP.  However, we did not in 
Michael have to decide the issue in the context of an intrastate 
 
1 M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2014).  
2 G.B. v. Dist. of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 109, 113 (D.D.C. 
2015).  
3 E.g., Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 959 F.#d 
59, 532 (2d Cir. 2020). 
4 202 F.3d 642, 650 (3d Cir. 2000). 
2 
 
transfer.  Addressing interstate transfers, we held in Michael 
that “when a student moves from State A to State B, any prior 
IEP in effect in State A need not be treated by State B as 
continuing automatically in effect.”5  “Because Congress left 
primary responsibility for providing a FAPE and for 
implementing the IDEA to the states, we [found] it unlikely 
that Congress intended the stay-put provision . . . to impose a 
requirement on states that they must implement an IEP 
established in another state without considering how consistent 
that IEP was with the policies and mandates of the student’s 
new residential state.”6  Moreover, although Michael was 
decided before the intrastate-transfer provision, and nearly-
identical interstate-transfer provision,7 were enacted, those 
provisions do not undermine – indeed, they enhance – 
Michael’s holding that the stay-put provision sometimes must 
yield to other provisions of the IDEA.  
 
The first reason for which the stay-put provision must 
yield to the intrastate-transfer provision is because the text of 
the intrastate-transfer provision and its accompanying 
regulations state that a transferee school district “shall provide” 
a FAPE “including services comparable to those in the 
previously held IEP.”8  It speaks in mandatory terms, 
acknowledges the existence of a “previously held IEP,” 
explicitly excuses strict compliance with that IEP, and does not 
create an exception for situations where the parents initiate a 
due process hearing.  The term “previously held IEP,” 
combined with the intrastate-transfer provision’s title, 
 
5 Id. at 651. 
6 Id.at 650.   
7 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(II). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) (emphasis added). 
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“Program for children who transfer school districts,” further 
confirms that the previously held IEP is no longer the 
mandatory standard used to determine the child’s placement.   
 
Moreover, the IDEA’s accompanying regulations 
provide more generally that a “child’s placement . . . [i]s based 
on the child’s IEP,”9 not that the placement must be identical 
to the placement in the previously held IEP.  Although the 
regulations state that “[t]he placement decision . . . [i]s made 
by a group of persons, including the parents, and other persons 
knowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluation 
data, and the placement options,”10 the intrastate-transfer 
provision requires the new school district to provide 
comparable services “in consultation with parents,” not to give 
the parents a veto power.  Indeed, it is ultimately the school 
district that makes a placement decision.11  “Parental 
dissatisfaction is channeled through administrative and (if 
necessary) judicial proceedings.”12   
 
Second, even though the Lakewood IEP’s placement 
was determined in accordance with state procedures, we do not 
think that Howell should be bound by all of Lakewood’s 
decisions.  The IDEA requires each local educational agency 
to adopt its own “policies, procedures, and programs that are 
consistent with the State policies and procedures” for 
 
9 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
10 Id. § 300.116(a)(1). 
11 See, e.g., Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. Of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 449 
(2d Cir. 2015) (“the duty to issue an IEP remains with the 
educational agency . . . and a parent’s right of participation is 




providing a FAPE.13  The Lakewood IEP was adopted under 
Lakewood’s policies and procedures, not Howell’s.  The stay-
put provision “prevents[s] local educational authorities from 
unilaterally changing a student’s existing educational 
program,14 but it does not allow parents to impose one school 
district’s policies onto another school district by voluntarily 
moving there.  Moreover, New Jersey’s “approval” of the 
Lakewood IEP was made under circumstances that no longer 
apply:  the fact that S.B. had been residing in a district that 
could not provide a FAPE for S.B.  As explained above, 
Howell has offered to provide a FAPE for S.B. 
 
 Third, Y.B.’s approach to the stay-put provision leaves 
no textual basis for an exception in cases where an intrastate-
transfer renders strict compliance with the previous IEP 
impossible.15  Although that situation is not before us, it is not 
clear how such an exception could exist if we hold, as Y.B. 
argues, that the “comparable” services provision in § 
1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I) must take a backseat to the stay-put 
provision.   
 
 Finally, “a more specific provision governs over a more 
general statute when there is conflict between the two 
statutes.”16  To the extent that there is any conflict between the 
intrastate-transfer and stay-put provisions, the intrastate-
 
13 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(1). 
14 Michael, 202 F.3d at 650. 
15 Cf. Ms. S. v. Vashon Island Sch. Dist., 337 F.3d 1115, 1134 
(9th Cir. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated 
in G.M. ex rel. Marchese v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary 
Sch.Dist., 595 F. App’s 698 (9th Cir. 2014). 
16 In re Udell, 454 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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transfer provision more specifically addresses what statutory 
requirements apply to transfer students.  Therefore, the 
intrastate-transfer provision governs.   
 
 In summary, when a student voluntarily transfers to a 
new district, the parents must accept the consequences of their 
decision:  that there is no longer any agreed-upon placement 
and therefore “the status quo no longer exists.”17  Although 
“parents [can] unilaterally change their child’s placement,” 
they “do so at their own financial risk.”18  If the courts 
ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the transferee 
school officials is appropriate, the parents are barred from 
obtaining reimbursement for any interim period.19   
 
I agree with our holding that S.B.’s educational 
placement at the time the dispute arose would be the 
“comparable services” offered by Howell.  It was not his 
placement at SCHI.20  Accordingly, I concur with the judgment 
of the Court.    
 
17 Ms. S., 337 F.3d at 1134. 
18 Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ.of Mass., 
471 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1985). 
19 See id. 
20 Cf. N.W. ex rel. J.W. v. Boone Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 763 F.3d 
611, 617 (6th Cir. 2014)) (holding that the private school to 
which parents sent child was not the child’s current placement 
because the school district never agreed to the placement). 
